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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Bergerud (hereinafter, Daniel) and Kathleen Bergerud (hereinafter, 
Kathleeen) appeal from their judgments of conviction for multiple drugs offenses. 
Daniel was found guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing, 
manufacture of a controlled substance where a child is present, possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, conspiracy to 
traffic in methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a 
controlled substance, marijuana. Kathleen was found guilty of the same offenses, as 
well as possession of a controlled substance, psilocybin. They assert that the district 
court abused its discretion by refusing to permit them to inquire into a witness' character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness. This Reply Brief addresses the State's assertion that 
the evidence was "marginally relevant" and therefore excludable. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Bergerud's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the Bergeruds from 
inquiring into Mr. Jones's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Permit The Bergeruds From 
Inquiring Into Mr. Jones's Character For Truthfulness Or Untruthfulness 
In its response, the State appears to concede that evidence at issue in the case 
was relevant, but that it could be excluded: "[b]ecause the specific instance of providing 
false information to the police was so remote, occurring some time seven or eight years 
prior to the trial, it was marginally relevant at best and the district court properly 
exercised its discretion by excluding it." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State cites to 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986), and Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 
559 (1987) for this proposition. In Van Arsda/I, the United States Supreme Court made 
the following statement which the Bergeruds believe the State must be relying on: 
It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense 
counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the 
contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-
examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that 
is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 
Van Arsda/I, 475 U.S. at 679. However, before this statement, the Court stated, "[o]f 
particular relevance here, '[w]e have recognized that the exposure of a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination."' Id. (citation omitted)'. Mr. Jones's truthfulness 
was clearly an issue in this case the court prohibited the Bergeruds' only opportunity to 
challenge it. The evidence was not "marginally relevant" just because it occurred seven 
or eight years prior to trial. 
In Roeh, the Court of Appeals stated, 
3 
As evidence goes back further in time-that is, becomes more remote-it 
is entitled to decreasing weight. At some point it becomes so remote that it 
no longer tends to make a fact 'of consequence ... more probable or less 
probable' and, therefore, is inadmissible because it is not relevant under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401. 
Roeh, ·113 Idaho at 559. Thus, the holding in Roeh is not that marginally relevant 
evidence is inadmissible, it is that evidence can be so remote that it is not relevant at all. 
And importantly, "[t]he determination of remoteness rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Blankenship v. Brookshier, 91 Idaho 317, 322, 420 P.2d 800, 805 (1966). 
The State does not cite to anything in the record where the district court made any 
determination that the remoteness of the incident made it irrelevant, and, indeed, the 
court made no such finding. This Court therefore should not engage in this fact finding. 
The State then relies on State v. Downing, 128 Idaho 149 (Ct. App. 1996), to 
support this argument. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) In Downing, the defendant asserted 
that he could have been permitted to cross examine the alleged victim about false 
allegations of sexual and physical abuse she had made eight or nine years prior to trial; 
she would have been six or seven years old when she made the allegations. Id. at 151-
52. The district court ruled that these allegations were irrelevant because they were 
"early childhood falsehoods" and the victim was now an adolescent. Id. at 152. The 
Court of Appeals concluded, 
Manifestly, the maturation that occurs between the ages of six and fifteen 
carries changes in understanding and perception, changes in the ability to 
distinguish fact from fiction, and changes in "character." In the exercise of 
its discretion the trial court could properly conclude that the alleged false 
accusations when E.D. was six or seven would have added nothing of 
probative value to the case. 
Id. at 152. Two things are important in Downing. First, the district court made a finding 
of remoteness, which is not present in the instance case. Second, and more 
4 
importantly, the case involved allegations by a child, where there would be changes in 
"understanding and perception" and the ability to distinguish fact from fiction. 
In this case, ML Jones was an adult and committed the adult crime of being 
untruthful to the police. The concerns about changes in understanding, perception, and 
the ability to distinguish fact from fiction are simply not present here. In the context of 
adults with felony records, l.R.E. 609(b) provides that, subject to some exception, 
felonies that are more than 10 years old are not admissible. l.R.E. 609(b). Thus, if 
Mr. Jones had been convicted of a felony, the conviction would not be so remote so as 
to be deemed irrelevant under Rule 609. As Mr. Jones asserted in the Appellant's Brief, 
he is not asserting that the evidence at issue was admissible pursuant to Rule 609, but 
Rule 609 can provide guidance for when Idaho courts should determine whether 
evidence of a prior crime is relevant to either a Rule 608 or Rule 609 analysis. 
Evidence that Mr. Jones had lied to the police was not so remote as to be 
irrelevant. And it was critical to the Bergeruds' defense. Thus, the district court abused 
its discretion by failing to permit the Bergeruds from inquiring as to whether Mr. Jones 
had ever lied to the police. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bergeruds request that their convictions be vacated and their cases 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2013. 
JUSTIN I '~ ll!RTIS' 
Deputy $,}a~ Appellate Public Defender 
'\+f 
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